Copp (Wilfrid Laurier Univ.) is a leading Canadian military historian, a scholar with the knack of standing received interpretations on their heads. Here, he takes on the well-established view that the Canadian divisions fighting in Normandy in the weeks after D-Day were less than superb in action. This argument has been made by British and US writers, and by not a few Canadians as well. But Copp does what they have not--studied the ground, the effectiveness of the weapons employed, and the German defensive and Canadian offensive tactics. The relatively untried Canadian divisions, Copp argues, fought very well, suffered huge casualties because they were in action so frequently, learned fast, and destroyed some of the best enemy formations in France in hardened defenses. To him, the Canadian ordinary soldiers, platoon commanders, and a few very able battalion commanders did the job; if anyone held back the advance, it was the Canadian senior leadership. Copp is no great stylist, but he is a demon researcher. Every chapter demonstrates his mastery of both micro- and macro-research. His arguments will stir controversy, and if his book leads to a reappraisal of Canadian, British, and German effectiveness and tactics--and it should--Copp will have achieved his purpose. ^BSumming Up: Recommended. All levels/collections. J. L. Granatstein emeritus, Canadian War Museum